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Extensive debate surrounds the question of how regulators should respond to the ex-
ternalization of risk associated with moral hazard in financial markets. The capacity of market
actors to externalize risk is related to transactional complexity. Complexity, for example,
augments reliance on valuation methods that can obscure risk, aggravating moral hazard. Re-
cently, scholars and policymakers have articulated strategies for regulating transactional
complexity that, this Article finds, reflect a shift from a contract law to a property law rubric
for understanding financial products. This Article articulates this shift and assesses its regu-
latory implications. Some call for standardization of financial products. Others call for treat-
ing financial products like goods, to be regulated for public safety. But what justifies curtail-
ing freedom of contract? While there are numerous theories of regulation, and of the
relationship between law and markets, this Article contends that markets are legally con-
structed and that the private law doctrines that govern financial transactions present under-
explored regulatory possibilities. It considers the extent to which financial products have
property - distinguishable from contract - attributes, such that their regulation could fall
within the justificatory ambit of property law doctrines that concern liquidity and soundness
of markets. The normative implications of a property-oriented view of financial products are
under-developed for want of the type of analysis that this Article begins. The problem of moral
hazard could become less menacing if lawmakers were to effectively balance complexity and
third-party concerns. This Article lays ground forfurther inquiry into how they might do so.
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Extensive debate surrounds the question of how regulators should respond
to the externalization of risk-and socialization of loss-associated with moral haz-
ard in financial markets. This Article turns attention to the relationship between
moral hazard' and the private law infrastructure of financial markets.2 Contract and
property doctrines3 determine the enforceability of the transactional arrangements
with which market actors externalize risk.4
The capacity of market actors to externalize risk is related to transactional
complexity.5 While we do not fully understand the problems of complexity, or how
1 Moral hazard has featured prominently in discussions of originate-to-distribute ap-
proaches to lending and of contexts in which financial institutions act with expectations that
the state will ultimately prevent their failure.
2 Regulation in response to the 2008 crisis has centered on federal, legislative initia-
tives focused on regulated institutions and federal, administrative bodies with regulatory
power. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulation: Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 39
(2009); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus. L.
REv. 1 (2011) (discussing the role of speculative trading of over-the-counter derivatives in the
financial crisis). Much of the recent regulation targets due diligence incentives, fraud incen-
tives, capital adequacy, and conflicts of interest. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2011).
3 Meaning, the laws contained, in the United States, in the common law and the Uni-
form Commercial Code of each jurisdiction, along with related statutes, such as corporation
and other limited liability entity statutes.
4 This Article contends that markets are legally constructed, and that we should take a
closer look at the nature of the private law obligations from which markets derive. We can un-
derstand the legal infrastructure of markets not just as a "web of legally permissible IOUs,"
but also as a system that creates and transfers in rem rights. This understanding can potentially
expand regulatory possibilities. Cf Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP.
ECON. 315 (2013) (stating a legal theory of finance (LTF) in which markets are legally con-
structed and occupy a hybrid public-private space). Pistor describes the legal constitution of
markets in contract-oriented terms, contending that a "web of legally permissible IOUs - cred-
its, bonds, derivatives, but also common stock, convertible shares, etc. - that link parties to one
another constitutes financial markets and determines their scope." Id. at 318. The law-finance
paradox puts markets in tension with law when enforcement of contractual obligations threat-
ens the financial system. As such, legal elasticity at the apex of financial/ legal systems demar-
cates power: we can relate the political economy of markets to the intersection between hierar-
chies in finance and elasticity in law. Id.at 316, 328. Pistor finds that law tends to be binding at
the periphery of the financial system and elastic at its apex. Id. at 317. She suggests that more
elasticity at the periphery could provide important safety valves to prevent financial crises. Id.
at 329. This Article, in contrast, turns attention to the efficacy of contracts/property distinc-
tions among the private law rules that constitute markets in order to lay groundwork for ex-
ploring the possibility that property doctrine could reduce instability by reigning in complexi-
ty and moral hazard in financial transactions.
5 While there is much discussion of whether and how to regulate market complexity,
relatively few legal scholars directly take up the challenge of defining market complexity and
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best to regulate it,6 complexity can aggravate complacency of investors and regula-
tors, conflicts of interest, and the efficacy of valuation methods, all of which aggra-
vate moral hazard.7
Since the 2008 financial crisis, scholars and policymakers have articulated
strategies for regulating complexity that-this Article contends -reflect a shift from a
contract law to a property law rubric for understanding financial products. Scholars
invoke the property concept of numerus clausus, contending that the law should not
permit financial products that are so novel or "excessively" complex8 as to be unrec-
ognizable to market actors.9 In addition, the recently created U.S. Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau regulates financial products for public safety and fitness for
consumers: as analogous to goods.10
What, from a regulatory standpoint, justifies curtailing freedom of contract?
Contract rights are enforceable only against parties to a contract, and as such can be
unlimited in their potential complexity. Property conveyances, on the other hand, are
enforceable against third parties; property law considers the interests of third parties.
It does so in a variety of ways, such as with rules that reflect the concept of numerus
clausus, through selective enforcement (with ostensible ownership and bona fide pur-
chaser doctrines, for example), and with registries that establish notice conventions."
its regulatory implications. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the nature of market complexity, see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARv. Bus. L. REV. 235 (2012) (assessing the elements of complexity
in financial markets, the relationship between complexity and innovation, and their regulatory
implications) and Manuel A. Utset, Financial System Engineering, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 377
(2013) (applying concepts from the field of engineering to explore complexity and to recom-
mend engineering-based approaches to complexity in financial systems).
6The question of whether regulation can or should curtail complexity is contested.
See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REv. 657 (2012) (analyzing instances where investors are removed from under-
lying assets to a degree that results in problematic complexity); Saule T. Omarova, License to
Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 64 (2012) (discuss-
ing complexity and systemic risk and proposing ex ante regulatory assessment of complex fi-
nancial products); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 211 (2010) (stating that complexity presents the greatest challenge to financial markets
in the future).
7 See Jonathan Lipson, Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces, in LESSONS
FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIs 43 (Robert W. Kolb ed. 2010); infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III. A product is excessively complex, we could say, when the amount
of information required to analyze it exceeds the bounded rationality of relevant market ac-
tors. See Awrey, supra note 5, at 243-44, 265.
9 Numerus clausus means "the number is closed." See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part III.B.
11 This Article focuses on the numerus clausus concept in property law in discussions
of financial product complexity. However, the various ways in which property law concerns
third parties are relevant to articulating property in financial markets contexts (to which nu-
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As regulators struggle to assess the problems that complexity presents, the
private law of property, scholars observe, already contemplates the notion that com-
plexity of transactions can be harmful to markets.12 Property law connects complexity
and liquidity: tailoring conveyances to reflect parties' intentions increases liquidity,
but excessive complexity undermines it.13 This Article identifies recent developments
in the field of financial regulation as property-oriented strategies and assesses their
potential and their limitations. Scholars and policymakers reference property law
concepts, but do not fully explore the regulatory implications of property-based con-
ceptions of financial products.
While there are numerous conceptions of regulation, and of the relationship
between law and markets, this Article contends that markets are legally constructed
and that the private law doctrines that govern financial transactions present under-
explored regulatory possibilities.14 A turn to property law aspects of financial mar-
merus clausus type rules could potentially apply). See infra Part I.
12 See C. Y. Chu, The Regulation of Structured Debts: Why? WAhat? And How?, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 443 (2009-2010) (presenting a property theory of complex financial products and
arguing for application of numerus clausus principles to them); David A. Dana, The Foreclosure
Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (2010) (argu-
ing that property law expresses an antifragmentation principle that should be applied in mort-
gage markets to avoid excessive fragmentation of rights that prevents modifications); Rashmi
Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1369 (2011) (discussing the role of property
in stabilizing markets that are prone to bubbles and developing a theory of use of property as
facilitative of stable market exchange); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Inter-
mediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 2030 (2010) (referencing numerus clausus rules to argue that
interests in mutual funds should only come in standardized forms in order to drive down in-
formation costs); Edward J. Janger, The Cost of Liquidity Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk
Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39 (2009) (identifying
costs of liquidity enhancement mechanisms in financial markets and observing that market
participants and policymakers have overlooked costs understood by property theorists); Ad-
am J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1255 (2012)
(citing Merrill and Smith in support of the position that mortgage products should be stand-
ardized); Note, The Perils of Fragmentation and Reckless Innovation, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1799 (2012)
(applying the property concepts of an anti-commons and of numerus clausus to assess the fi-
nancial crisis) [hereinafter Note, Perils].
13 Legal limitations on complexity meant to promote marketability pervade property
law. These include rules against unreasonable restraints on alienation or creation of new es-
tates, for example. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAcrICES
(5th ed. 2006).
14 Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz describe four basic types of financial markets
regulations: 1) market-integrity regulations that promote fairness, such as disclosure require-
ments, trading exchanges oversight, and unfair market manipulation; 2) competition regula-
tion; 3) prudential regulation, such as capital adequacy requirements, investment and risk
management guidelines; and 4) consumer-protection regulation, such as rules for adequacy of
disclosure and fairness in dispute resolution. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regu-
lating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 87
(2013). The pervasiveness of these types of regulation, they find, establish law as an integral
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kets generates opportunity for regulatory innovation and competition, as state and
federal, legislative and judicial actors can engage questions regarding the legal effica-
cy of property interests.5 This Article advances the possibilities for effective use of
property law concepts in financial regulation by interpreting the private law infra-
structure of financial products to emphasize property elements.
Financial markets are often understood in purely contracts-based (and also
often contractarian) terms.16 Henry E. Smith observes that "Thomas Grey pointed to
the rise of abstract rights from increasingly sophisticated contracting and financial
engineering as incompatible with any robust notion of property."17 Many legal
thinkers challenge the notion of a meaningful distinction between contract and prop-
erty.18 This rejection privileges a contracts-oriented view of markets in which parties
may enter financial transactions on any terms that they find mutually beneficial,
however complex, without regard for third parties.
But the view that a contracts/property distinction lacks viability or conse-
quence is not universal. Contemporary corporate law literature actively engages the
question of whether property law-as distinct from contract law-matters. Contrac-
component of the financial system. Id. This Article's turn to the private law infrastructure of
financial markets concerns the first and the fourth types of regulation they describe. Private
law doctrines that regulate what property interests the law will recognize -the 'true sale' doc-
trine, rules against unreasonable restraints on alienation, rules against remote vesting, rules
limiting permissible forms of estate-concem notice and fairness among market participants
and deter market manipulation. Doctrines pertaining to products per se and product safety -
such as warranties of fitness - concern the relationship between the institutions that sell prod-
ucts and their retail customers. See infra Part Ill.
15 See infra Part III.
16 The terms "contracts-oriented" or "contracts-based," as used here, refer to views of
financial markets rooted in legal realist theories contending that property is a set of relations
among legal actors, rather than a relation between a legal actor and an object or thing, such
that property is largely indistinguishable from contract. The terms "contractarian" or "contrac-
tarianism" refer, in general, to a political theory of authority in which the legitimacy of gov-
ernmental authority derives from the consent of the governed, and consent derives from the
idea of contract or mutual agreement. See generally STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu (last visited May 5, 2015). In the context of contemporary private
law, the term "contractarian" references a theory of corporate law. See Michael Klausner, The
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, J. CORP. L. 779, 782 (2006); infra notes
19-22 and accompanying text. The contractarian theory of corporate law departs from-but
has not displaced-Berle and Means's assertion that corporate law steeps in a problem of
management responsibility that is a function of the separation of ownership and control. See
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev.
ed. 1991); William W. Bratton, Essay, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26
IOWA J. CORP. L. 737 (2001).
17 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1691, 1720 (2012).
18 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY
69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. 1980).
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tarian theories of the firm maintain that the relationship between managers and
shareholders of a corporation is contractual; market forces will create optimal corpo-
rate contracts because promises of effective governance arrangements yield value to
shareholders.19 Under this approach, the firm is a nexus of contracts about assets, not
a system of shared ownership defined by in rem rights in assets.20 Others, however,
assert property law foundations of the firm. 21 They contend that the contractarian
view, among other things, overlooks how property law enables shared ownership of
productive assets by protecting owners' entitlements against dealings with third par-
ties.1
Property-based theories of the firm use a functional definition of property.3
Similarly, property in this Article refers to a range of market phenomena, including:
transactional arrangements and rules that create rights of exclusion beyond what
contracts may create; transactional arrangements that create packaged entitlements
that cannot be fully disaggregated down to their smallest atoms; and technical, re-
flexive formalities of conveyancing that on a pragmatic level give rise among market
participants to a presumption of in rem rights in assets.
At issue in the corporate literature are the nature of the firm and the efficien-
cy of firm governance given agency costs (due to separation of ownership and con-
trol, and diffusion of owners).24 At issue here, in contrast, is the under-explored po-
19 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Klausner, supra note 16, at 782; cf Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
20 See John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law,
27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 431 (2007).
21 See id.; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of
Debt, 113 Q.J. EcON. 1 (1998); Olive Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1119 (1990).
22 See Armour & Whincop, supra note 20. Armour and Whincop point out:
An economist may note the structural similarity between the regulatory character of
the various strategies that limit the scope of property rights so as to minimize third party costs,
and those rules which deny enforceability to contracts that impose externalities. . . . This
seems, however, to be only a point of semantics. Regardless of how the relevant body of rules
are described, it is nevertheless the case that . .. they have a role to play that is functionally
more significant than the provision of contractual default rules. Armour & Whincop, supra
note 20, at 448.
Rules that deny enforceability to contracts that create negative externalities, such as
contracts to pollute or to commit a crime, may appear structurally similar to rules that limit the
scope of property rights to minimize third party costs. But the functional significance of the
roles played by legal rules that deal with determining which shared control arrangements can
bind third parties is overlooked and can account for the non-trivial functions of corporate law.
Id.
23 See id.
24 See id.; Bratton, supra note 16; Klausner, supra note 16.
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tential of taking property seriously for purposes of regulating financial markets. We
have not yet fully excavated the regulatory potential of property law strategies to re-
spond to complexity and moral hazard. A turn towards private law aspects of finan-
cial markets focuses on questions of enforceability within transactional structures
and how these affect risk-taking by market actors.
We could draw on property concepts like numerus clausus without concern
for whether property consists of in rem rights or of aggregated legal relations. But de-
lineating property elements, distinguishable from contract, in financial markets ex-
pands and fortifies regulatory possibilities. First, a turn towards property law strate-
gies for mitigating complexity and moral hazard implies a shift in justificatory
posture for financial regulation. Regulation can seem caught in a discourse in which
it must justify "interfering" in markets, or curtailing market actors' freedom of con-
tract. From a property perspective, applying legal doctrines to balance the intentions
of transacting parties with collective concerns (like the intelligibility of interests) is
not "interference," but rather administration of the legal architecture of markets
themselves. The state does not infringe on freedom of contract in regulating forms
and complexity of property interest. Rather, it merely administers well-worn market
fundamentals, balancing complexity and liquidity. Second, a turn towards property
law strategies can foster regulatory competition and innovation,2 given the range of
law and policymakers involved in delineating property rights. Judges, state legisla-
tures, bankruptcy courts, U.S. Congress, private law-making bodies: all of these can
and do participate in defining enforceable property interests.
Though the influence of contracts-based and contractarian conceptions of
private law remains strong, contemporary legal scholars do reference and articulate
conceptions of property -distinguishable from contract-in financial markets. This
Article presents two distinct and current theoretical presentations of property in the
financial markets context. The two bodies of work about property in markets pre-
sented here - one by Henry Smith and the other by Annelise Riles - are radically dif-
ferent in methodology and purpose. Smith is a property theorist. Riles is an ethnog-
rapher who has studied practices surrounding swap collateral - a type of property
conveyance central to financial markets. Despite their very different scholarly pur-
poses, however, Smith and Riles have commonalities that are illuminating here: they
both depart from purely contracts-based conceptions of markets and they both strike
a very contemporary, neo-formalist chord. They are paired here in order to show the
breadth and depth of current takes on property in financial markets -to show that
25 See Zaring & Cunningham, supra note 2.
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the state of private law theory now supports an understanding of markets in which
property-based approaches to regulation can have traction.
Smith describes property as "the law of things" defined by an exclusion-
governance architecture (and not a "bundle of rights" susceptible to limitless dis-
aggregation).26 Smith emphasizes that property is modular in nature and states that
his theory functions in the context of entity property and structured finance.27 In a
different vein, other scholars articulate conceptions of property in terms of pragma-
tism and legal technique.28 Riles presents collateral in derivatives markets as a tech-
nique and an aesthetic practice.29 The purpose, here, is to offer a couple of readings of
financial markets that are 'property stories,' in order to develop a sense of the private
law infrastructure in markets for which property concepts could be relevant for regu-
lation. The writings of Smith and of Riles both depart, albeit in very different ways,
from contracts-based conceptions of financial markets that support the limitless de-
composition and re-composition of assets that can enable problematic market com-
plexity.
Bringing property concepts to bear on financial products questions what is a
valid agreement or conveyance.30 Complex financial transactions are not just a func-
tion of market actors' engineering that the law then needs to control or regulate to
contain risk. These transactions are uses of contract and property doctrine -bodies of
private law that regulate what forms of transaction the state will recognize.31
26 See Smith, supra note 17.
27 Cf Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PENN. L. REv. 1955 (2012). Lee Anne
Fennell's description of "lumpy property" echoes Smith's theme of modularity, but with a dif-
ferent analytical purpose.
28 See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strate-
gy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. (1999); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Im-
manent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal
Formalism, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583 (1993).
29 See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011); see also Heather Hughes, Book Review: Derivatives Traders Do What,
Again?, 30 J.L. & CoM. 203 (2012) (reviewing RILES, supra).
30 For example, a turn to the validity of property conveyances requires attention to the
bases for rights of exclusion. Numerous theories of property focus on rights of exclusion. See
SINGER, supra note 13. Property theorists, though, are not unanimous on the centrality of exclu-
sion. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1853 (2012) (describ-
ing property in terms of mechanisms of internal governance and arguing that we can no long-
er regard the right to exclude as the single most important aspect of ownership).
31 Securitization transactions have long raised questions about the validity of exclud-
ing an originator's creditors from securitized assets. In transactional contexts where the origi-
nator conveys the assets in a true sale, receiving a fair market price in the form of the securiti-
zation's proceeds, few argue that the originator's creditors are unfairly excluded. However, in
transactional contexts where the level of recourse is high or the proceeds of the transaction do
not add as much value as the assets assigned to investors, many question the fairness of exclu-
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Rather than leave financial markets to the realm contract, in which parties
may enter into any transactional arrangements they wish, we should consider the
wisdom of private law concepts that require transactions to be intelligible to third
parties.32 To the extent banks create financial products that are more readily discerni-
ble to market participants generally, they become less able to generate transactional
complexity that can augment the use of mark-to-model valuation for non-liquid fi-
nancial products, and reliance on mark-to-market valuation for liquid products-
factors that facilitate externalizing risk or moral hazard.33
Part I discusses the private law infrastructure of financial products, how
property law regulates forms of interest and notice, and the concept of numerus clau-
sus. It reads the private law aspect of financial transactions, first, as a theoretical mat-
ter, offering two contemporary views of property in financial markets that depart
from the contracts-oriented view; and, second, as a doctrinal matter, identifying as-
pects of financial products that create rights of exclusion in assets beyond what con-
tracting parties generally can create.
Part II discusses the relationship between transactional complexity and mor-
al hazard. When financial institutions create a complex product for which there is not
an existing market, they may use mark-to-model valuation to price these assets for
their balance sheets. Mark-to-model valuation for non-liquid assets can contribute to
opacity surrounding the value of banks' books.34 The difficulty of understanding a
model, and of accessing information to assess its accuracy, obscure information about
the financial health of institutions holding assets priced using the mark-to-model
method. If financial institutions can obscure their value, they may be in riskier posi-
tions than the market can discern. When institutions issue complex financial prod-
ucts for which there is an existing market, the mark-to-market method enables valua-
tion based on market activity rather than on due diligence establishing the value of
sion. For example, Judge Bodoh, in In re LTV Steel Company, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (2001), held that
an originator's creditors retain an interest in the originator's securitized assets pending adjudi-
cation of any 'true sale' questions. In this bankruptcy case, the judge denied an emergency mo-
tion by investors to modify an interim order permitting the creditors of LTV Steel Company to
draw on assets that had been assigned to special purpose vehicles pending resolution of the
case. Judge Bodoh used property reasoning, stating, "there seems to be an element of sophistry
to suggest hat [LTV] does not retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject
to the interim order." Id. at 285. Describing the basis for this property interest, he writes: "To
suggest hat [LTV] lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own labor,
as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept." Id.
32 See infra Part III.C.
33 See infra Part II.B.
34 Cf Awrey, supra note 5, at 253-54 (discussing opacity as a significant driver of com-
plexity and observing that the marketplace lacks information needed to accurately determine
the enterprise value of banks).
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assets. If a financial product is sufficiently complex, mark-to-market may be far more
efficient than independent assessment. This aggravates moral hazard problems, as
issuances can be over-valued in a rising market, inducing issuers to generate more
products the risks of which they externalize.
Part III presents recent trends in financial regulation scholarship and policy,
identifying property-oriented strategies for regulating financial markets. Numerous
legal scholars identify property concepts aimed at keeping transactions intelligible to
third parties, such as numerus clausus, as a possible basis for financial regulation. But
none, so far, move beyond general assertions about private law responses to com-
plexity. In addition, recent regulatory innovations rely on a conceptual shift from
treatment of financial products as contractual transactions to treatment of them as
products (i.e., like goods or other personalty subject to welfare regulation). To date,
however, these regulatory innovations seem to rely on an analogy comparing finan-
cial products to goods based on the fact that both can have deleterious effects on con-
sumers and on financial systems if they are defective. This Article, by providing doc-
trinal and theoretical frameworks with which to consider financial products from a
property perspective, enables a more thorough inquiry into the regulatory implica-
tions of this conceptual shift.
The normative implications of a property-oriented view of financial products
are under-developed for want of the type of analysis that this Article begins. The
problem of moral hazard - the capacity of market actors to socialize loss (and privat-
ize gain) - could, potentially, become less menacing if lawmakers were to effectively
apply old, private law strategies for balancing complexity and third-party concerns.
This Article lays ground for further inquiry into whether and how they might do so.
I. The Private Law Infrastructure of Financial Products
Market activity is a function of the contract and property doctrines that gov-
ern financial transactions.35 This Part discusses the relationship between contracts,
property and complex financial transactions. An understanding of the private law
infrastructure of financial products will facilitate consideration of private law strate-
gies for mitigating complexity and moral hazard.
35 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 14 (presenting law as a critical, constitutive
component in financial systems); Pistor, supra note 4 (finding that markets are legally consti-
tuted).
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A. Private Law Responses to Complexity
Property law doctrines -such as the 'true sale' doctrine, rules against unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation, rules against remote vesting, rules limiting permissi-
ble forms of estate -regulate the forms of property interest that the law will recog-
nize. These rules concern liquidity, notice and fairness among market participants,
and deterrence of market manipulation. Private law doctrines pertaining to prod-
ucts - such as warranties of fitness - regulate the relationship between entities that
sell products and their retail customers. These rules can, though do not necessarily,
concern complexity. They may concern complexity where they require standardiza-
tion (for disclosure purposes).
Standardization of transactions by market actors and by private lawmaking
bodies is one strategy for mitigating the effects of complexity. Standardized forms of
contract emerge in many contexts. Standardized contracts reduce transaction costs; to
the extent they mitigate complexity, they do so by enabling transacting parties, trade
groups, and other third parties to readily recognize the terms and structure of trans-
actions of a given type. Standard-form contracts can reduce information costs sur-
rounding transactions in contexts where market actors use (and do not materially al-
ter) collectively developed forms of agreement. 36 But while standardization of
contracts can reduce information costs, the phenomenon of contract standardization
in some instances does nothing to prevent creation of opaque, complex instruments
in other instances. Hence, scholars and policymakers have been making property-
based arguments for standardization of financial products.
Property conveyances create legally recognizable interests- meaning, de-
spite the transacting parties' objectives, the law will not enforce property conveyanc-
es that are unrecognizable in form, that contain unreasonable restraints on alienation,
or that vest remotely, for example. In the realm of property assignments, legal doc-
trines that limit forms of property interest may not, in fact, reduce transaction costs.
They may increase costs in contexts, for example, where it is challenging to both ef-
fectuate parties' intentions and create conveyances that the law will recognize.
Property rules do address information costs. Information costs may or may
not be related to transactional complexity, and complexity itself is multi-faceted. Dan
Awrey identifies, as one driver of complexity, opacity that "stems from the dense 'in-
formation thicket' generated by the overwhelming volume of data" constituting con-
36 Many such contexts exist, including, for example, use of Bond Market Association




temporary markets.37 We could say that property law concepts mitigate this opacity
by making at least some components of the 'information thicket' more intelligible to
market participants. As property passes to successors in interest, in a market charac-
terized by information thickets, information is not just difficult to obtain, but also can
be lost.38 Property doctrine contemplates the loss of information, for example, about
grantors' subjective intentions in creating and conveying assets. Limitations on forms
of interest can respond to this kind of loss by enabling market actors to work with
objective intent and default inferences that follow from various forms of convey-
ance.39
There are several features of property systems that limit the forms that inter-
ests may take. For example, the 'true sale' doctrine recognizes a conveyance of an
ownership interest (rather than a lien) only when the level of recourse between the
transacting parties creates legal obligations consistent with an ownership interest in
the buyer. The estates system restricts the forms of fee that parties can create and
convey by deed. Conceptually, we refer to numerus clausus to express the notion that
property law permits only legally recognizable interests.40 Numerus clausus expresses
a principle of property law that appears across legal systems -property interests
must adhere to legally recognizable forms.41
The common law estates system rules require that conveyances of real estate
take the form of one of a finite set of recognizable interests, such as the fee simple, the
fee simple subject to condition subsequent, the leasehold.42 The set of recognized
forms can evolve over time-property law recognized the condominium in the
37 Awrey, supra note 5, at 252 (quoting Robert Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Infor-
mation Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1
(2010)).
38 Awrey, supra note 5, at 253.
39 See SINGER, supra note 13, at 439-48, 458, 616-19.
40 The principle of numerus clausus animates, for example, the rule against creation of
new estates. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893). Numerus clausus relates to
easements as well, as the law recognizes only a short list of negative easements (though the list
has expanded with the creation of statutory conservation, historical preservation and other
easements). Scholars reference numerus clausus in discussions of servitudes generally. For ex-
ample, one recent piece on servitudes and the economics of information reads: "There is some
recent literature related to the economic structure of servitude law. First, there is the general
issue of the numerus clausus structure inherent in property law; that is, the tendency to limit the
number of permissible property rights fractions so as to preserve property values. Merrill and
Smith (2000) argue that such limits on the types of property regimes reflect information and
measurement costs." Antony Dnes and Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Ser-
vitudes Governing Land, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 93 (2009).
41 See Merrill & Smith, infra note 49, at 4.
42 See generally SINGER, supra note 13, at 607-11.
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1960s.43 But transacting parties are not free to create novel forms of interest by
agreement."
Parties can vary the scope of a given property interest with servitudes. But
while covenants and easements enable transacting parties to tailor a property inter-
est, they do not permit parties to encumber property in any way they see fit.45 Prop-
erty law subjects covenants to the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation,
which can invalidate servitudes that impede the marketability of property. A servi-
tude may undermine marketability, for example, by allocating too much control to
grantors.46 Interests in property can be disaggregated into present and future inter-
ests, and among concurrent fee holders or among fee holders and servitude or en-
cumbrance holders.
Legal scholars sometimes reference numerus clausus and boilerplate or stand-
ardization generally, without identifying the distinction between rules limiting forms
of property interest and the phenomenon of standardization of contracts.47 But again,
under contracts law, parties are generally free to contract around standardized
forms. Standardization of contract terms can serve a range of functions -some echo
the function of numerus clausus in property law, others do not.48
43 See Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 987 (1963); Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficien-
cy, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1991).
44 In addition, contracting parties are not free to create interests that vest too far into
the future, under the rule against perpetuities. See generally SINGER, supra note 13, at 628-41.
45 Trusts, also, enable parties to tailor the benefits of property interests. Some scholars
view trust law as providing exception to property law's restrictions on forms of ownership.
Trust law does not escape the rule that trustees must hold title to property in a recognizable
form, but trust law does split the title from the benefit of property interests. See Kent D. Schen-
kel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REv. 181 (2009).
46 The rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation can also invalidate servitudes
that are unreasonable in the sense that they express invalid preferences, such as racially restric-
tive covenants.
47 See infra Part III.A.
48 As noted above, contracts also can tend toward standardization of course. See Ian
Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2047 (2012)
(looking at rules that allow private parties to opt out of default legal positions); Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 531 (2005) (arguing that the
distinction between property and contract law is not always clear, and that standardized form
contracts can allow for more protection of value than either non-boilerplate contracts or prop-
erty rights would allow); Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1409-11 (2009) (identifying the numerus clausus principle in
contracts law and applying Merrill & Smith's optimality theory in the context of contracts);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773,
783-86 (2001) (discussing contexts that involve a mix of in rem and in personam rights, such as
the security interest, bailment, landlord-tenant, and trusts); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Con-
tracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006) (presenting boiler-
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The most widely-cited explication of numerus clausus in U.S. property laws is
by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith. Merrill and Smith-in several articles, but most
notably in Optimal Standardization i the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princi-
ple49-explain numerus clausus in economic terms. Because property rights are in rem,
third parties must invest in determining the scope of these rights. Property rights
that are unusual are more costly to assess. "Those creating or transferring idiosyn-
cratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in measure-
ment costs fully into account," Merrill and Smith explain, "making them a true ex-
ternality."50 The rules that effectuate the numerus clausus principle in property law
reduce these measurement costs.
This explanation of numerus clausus is not about concern for fragmentation,
per se, of property rights.51 Numerus clausus rules may limit fragmentation, but this is
an effect, not an explanation of numerus clausuS.52 This principle limits property to
specified types of rights. It does not limit the number of rights holders. Limiting le-
gally recognizable types of property rights reduces measurement costs for market
participants generally - not just for successors in interest to particular rights that may
be difficult to measure.53 Fragmentation, in contrast, affects disposition and use of
property where coordination problems among rights holders prevent efficient utili-
zation.
Not all scholars agree with the view of numerus clausus presented by Merrill
and Smith.5 These critics, however, do not reject the concept that standardization, or
plate contract language as an intermediary point between contract law generally and property
law); cf Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 475 (2002) (questioning the need for law to impose limitations on form, observing that
where standardization is optimal, parties will produce it regardless); Henry E. Smith, Modular-
ity in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 5-9, 16 (2011) (comparing the numerus clausus principle in
property law to certain elements of tort law that reflect a modularity-based system).
49 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i  the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
50 Merrill & Smith, supra note 49, at 8.
51 Michael Heller observes that fragmentation can yield an "anticommons" where
multiple interest-holders with rights to exclude others from a valuable resource maximize
their own benefits while imposing costs on others, leading to systemic underutilization of
property. Fragmentation can yield coordination problems where too many parties have exclu-
sionary rights over the use or disposition of a resource. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999) (arguing that excessive rights allocation in property
can lead to devaluation in an unproductive anticommons); Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of
Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417 (2000) (suggesting that the numerus clausus principle miti-
gates against undesirable fragmentation of property interests that depresses productivity).
52 Merrill & Smith, supra note 49, at 6.
53 Id. at 8.
54 See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L.
REv. 1597 (2008) (numerus clausus relates to the need for a stable set of forms through which to
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a stable set of forms of interest, is beneficial to markets and relates to the capacity of
third parties to comprehend interests. For example, Hansmann and Kraakman con-
cede that there must be some institution that enables third parties to determine who
controls various incidents of ownership; this institution does not have to take the
form of numerus clausus rules however.55 Lee Anne Fennell contends that a state-run
"option exchange" for property interests would be superior to the rules of numerus
clausus for balancing third-party information costs with the need for effectuating par-
ties' interests.56
The purpose here is not to defend Merrill and Smith's explanation of numerus
clausus. The scholars discussed in Part III refer overwhelmingly to Merrill and Smith
in invoking the relevance of numerus clausus for financial regulation, and so their
work serves as a starting point, here, for thinking about property concepts in finan-
cial markets.
B. Theory: Financial Engineering and Property
In order to facilitate consideration of property law strategies for financial
regulation, this Part articulates a property infrastructure of financial products and
markets. Again, the distinction between property law and contract law, its theoretical
grounding and utility, is contentious among legal scholars. Yet despite the preva-
lence of contracts-based and contractarian perspectives, contemporary lines of think-
ing about financial markets do present contracts/property distinctions.57 For exam-
express property rules evolving in response to competing social goals); Avihay Dorfman, Prop-
erty and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 471-74,
478, 490, 505, 517 (2011) (criticizing Merrill and Smith for implying that a limited set of inter-
ests is superior to a larger one, for rooting property law in exclusive use, and for arguing that
only legislators may create new property interests); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1565-68 (2003) (departing from Merrill and Smith to argue that the numerus
clausus principle works because parties to a transaction have expectations about how institu-
tions work, rather than because of its external effects such as on information costs); Lee Anne
Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORTs L. 1, 53-56 (2011) (a government-run "option ex-
change" for property interests would better balance effectuating parties' intent with third par-
ty information costs than do rules of numerus clausus); Frankel, supra note 48, at 482-83 (where
standardization is optimal, transacting parties tend to produce it regardless of legal restrictions
on form); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Nu-
merus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 373, 382-83, 398 (2002)
(the state need not regulate the content of property rights, so long as some institution exists to
enable third parties to identify those who control the various incidents of ownership); cf. Am-
non Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987 (2008).
55 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 54.
56 See Fennell, supra note 54.
57 The purpose here is not to assert the accuracy of one conception of property over
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ple, though their respective projects differ radically in focus, method and purpose,
Smith and Riles both write on an important level about property and markets, and
both we can describe as neo-formalist. Taken together, these two very different legal
scholars indicate depth and range in contemporary approaches to private law that
deal with property concepts in markets. As such, they provide theoretical ground-
work for exploring property-based possibilities for financial regulation.
Generally speaking, property rights are in rem, whereas contracts rights are
in personam. Contract rights are enforceable by and against the parties to the contract.
Contractual rights and obligations are unlimited in their potential complexity. Prop-
erty rights, in contrast, are enforceable against third parties. Because third parties
must assess and value property interests, idiosyncrasies and complexities can create
alienability concerns.58
This basic observation distinguishes property from contract, but many schol-
ars contest the existence of any viable boundary between these two fields of law. In
the words of Arthur Allen Leff, among Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's major contribu-
tions to legal analysis
[w]as the suggestion that some things, like 'property,' were not real-
ly, at law, 'things' at all, but force fields. Intelligent discourse, . . .
should not be directed towards deciding to whom a thing belonged,
because there was no thing to belong; there was only a bundle of
forces demanding, for sensible talk, a sort of vector analysis with
time coordinates.59
Property is not about a legal subject's relationship to an object, but rather about rela-
tions among legal subjects.
While contract-based and realist conceptions of entitlements continue to be
highly influential, property-based and formalist approaches have not waned. Nu-
merous contemporary property theorists reject the "bundle of sticks" metaphor and
its implication of limitless disaggregation in favor of focusing on in rem rights in
things, rights of exclusion from things, and rights running with things.60
another. Rather, it is to consider some conceptions of property in financial markets that could
support property law strategies for mitigating complexity and moral hazard.
58 Interests in real property take a finite set of forms, though servitudes and other en-
cumbrances create variability among property interests.
59 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 157 (1970).
60 See Yun-Chien Chang & Henry Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (2012); Smith, supra note 17; Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and
Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2011) (reviewing MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATIONS, AND COSTS LIVES
(2008)); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617
(2009) (reviewing THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
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Recently, a group of legal scholars has been discussing the "new private
law" -a movement to define and reify private law categories and operative princi-
ples.61 These scholars articulate distinctions between private and public law and
among the private law subjects.62 They reject what they see as persistent notions in
legal thinking that "all law is public law" or that "we are all realists now," in favor of
earnest explication of how law defines the rights and duties of individuals and pri-
vate entities as they relate to one another.63
A proponent of this movement, Smith describes the origins of the bundle of
rights notion of property as an analytical device employed by scholars like Hohfeld,
who attempted to "analyze legal relations into their smallest atoms."64 Smith explains
that Hohfeld accounted for the in rem aspects of some relations as collections of in
personam relations.65 In other words, the bundle picture denies, in essence, the exist-
ence of in rem rights as such; the phenomenon of rights enforceable generally is a
function of constellations of in personam rights functioning together. The bundle con-
cept, Smith writes, "puts no particular constraints on the contents of bundles: they
are totally malleable and should respond to policy concerns in a fairly direct fash-
ion." 66
Hohfeld's taxonomy of detachable legal relations, Smith contends, is only re-
alizable in a zero-transaction cost world (in which we do not live). In a world with
transaction costs, the features of property cannot be disaggregated to the atomic lev-
el. Property, rather, is a law of things - "packages of legal relations."67 Property is
modular. "Property defines things using an exclusion strategy of 'keep off' or 'don't
(2007))).
61 See Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1640 (2012).
62 See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARv. L.
REV. 1640 (2012); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
63 See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1640-41 (stating that private law "stands in contrast
to public law, which establishes the powers and responsibilities of governments, defines the
rights and duties of individuals in relation to governments, and governs relations between and
among nations").
64 Cf Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133 (2012) (stating that being more accurate than the bun-
dle of sticks notion is far short of articulating criteria for property as a legal concept); Smith,
supra note 17, at 1696.
65 Hohfeld described law as sets of fundamental relations that related to one another
as correlates and opposites. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See generally Pierre Schlag, How To Do Things With
Hohfeld, 78 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 185 (2015).
66 Smith, supra note 17, at 1697.
67 Id. at 1693.
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touch' and then enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces us-
ing governance strategies."68
"In a zero-transaction cost world, we could use all governance all the time,
whether supplied by government or through super fine-grained contracting among
all the concerned parties,"69 but in the real world, exclusion functions as a delineation
strategy. Modules -packages of legal relations-serve to contain third-party infor-
mation costs.
Exclusion is from this kind of legal thing, a modular package of relations. Ex-
clusion protects use rights. There is no interest in exclusion per se, but the right to ex-
clude is a core mechanism with which property serves owners' and society's needs
because it enables owners to utilize property.70
"Private parties can contract at the interfaces between modular rights, within
the constraints of the numerus clausus principle."71 In other words, property has an
architecture-modular packages of legal relations-that is also subject to governance
or private ordering. From the vantage point of the exclusion-governance architecture
that Smith ascribes to property, "the formalism of the exclusion strategy and the
modesty in the governance strategy make property more alienable."72 Relatively high
invariance to context makes the history of assets less relevant to successors in inter-
est, increasing the assets' alienability.
Smith criticizes realist conceptions of property, but as Eric Claeys points out,
offers in essence an instrumental understanding of property law.73 Without insisting
on a strict formalist understanding of private law that completely rejects realist in-
strumentalism, Claeys finds that Smith's theory of property exhibits too stark an in-
strumentalism to qualify as a departure from realist principles.74 Smith's theory does
68 Id. at 1694.
69 Id. at 1704.
70 Id. at 1710.
71 Id. at 1724.
72 Id. at 1711 (referencing earlier work in which he presents formalism as a matter of
degree). While Smith describes formalism as invariance to context, invariance to context is not
a hallmark of formalism, but of law generally. Formalism reflects a higher degree of invari-
ance, perhaps, than other approaches.
73 Claeys, supra note 64 (responding to Smith, supra note 17). Smith has argued before
that formalism in law can be a matter of degree; he calls this differential formalism. See Henry
E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
74 Claeys is drawing on John Gardner's view that law can be "teleological" without
merging into either functionalism or formalism. See Claeys, supra note 73, at 137 (referencing
John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part I: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2
(2011)). A less instrumental conception of law, on the other hand-whether we call it more
formalist, or teleological (as Claeys prefers)-would make "central the private law's 'internal
point of view.'" See Claeys, supra note 73, at 138 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
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not reach the philosophical question of "why and in what circumstances an owner
deserves a right to exclude."75
But the purpose of this Article is not to defend a theory of property. It is to
present notions of property with which we can articulate the private law infrastruc-
ture of financial products in a way that supports a turn to property concepts in finan-
cial regulation.
Smith contends that his theory of property bears out in the contexts of entity
property and structured finance. He references Thomas Grey's view that sophisticat-
ed contracting and financial engineering are not compatible with "any picture of
property other than as a label for any collection of features resulting from private and
public efforts at tailoring entitlements."76 Smith situates Grey's view in reference to
scholarship on problems surrounding the separation of ownership and control in
corporations.77 Contractarian theories of the firm contend that the relationship be-
tween managers and shareholders is contractual. As William Bratton puts it, the
"firm represents a series of contracts joining inputs and outputs," and so "ownership
becomes an irrelevant concept."78 Where Berle and Means found management prob-
lems stemming from the separation of ownership and control in corporations to be
the defining challenge of corporate law, contractarian theories assert that free market
competition drives firms to minimize agency costs and thereby solves the problem of
separation of ownership and control.79 If managers' incentives are aligned with
shareholders' interests because managers are contractually bound to either maximize
value or be dismissed, then there is no need for regulation of the relationship be-
tween managers and shareholders.8 0 As Bratton and others have observed, however,
this contractarian position has not succeeded in replacing Berle and Means because
agency costs persist where there is separation of ownership and control of entity
property.8 1 Entity property persists as a concept that is structurally integral to firms
and markets.82
102 (2d ed. 1994)).
75 Claeys, supra note 73, at 143 (noting that we might ask "why officials and citizens
who shape the political community's morals believe an owner deserves" a right to exclude, ra-
ther than asking about deservedness generally); id. at 143 n.60.
76 Smith, supra note 17, at 1721.
77 Id. at 1722 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)). See Bratton, supra note 16; Klausner, supra note 16;
supra note 16 (defining "contractarian" theories).
78 Bratton, supra note 16, at 755.
79 See id. at 755-57.
80 Id.
s Id.; see also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL RooTs OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 6-17 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandator/Enabling Balance
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Smith finds asset partitioning and entity property to be forms of modulariza-
tion that corroborate his theory. "Asset partitioning is a higher-level modulariza-
tion," Smith writes.83 "It allows for information specialization. It also permits conven-
ient substitution of one creditor for another without the need for coordination -just
as modular structures do generally."8" Smith writes: "Modular things are suited for
sending an 'in rem' message. The need for far-flung and sometimes socially distant
persons to respect property rights calls for simplifications and standardization."85
One type of financial transaction that has been the subject of much discus-
sion since the financial crisis is the issuance of asset-backed securities that are divid-
ed into tranches with distinct risk profiles.86 A private law strategy for financial regu-
lation could be to consider whether these issuances create modules that "send an in
rem message" to which we might apply numerus clausus principles.87
The value of asset-backed securities depends upon rights of exclusion. The
issuer acquires assets (such as mortgages, for example) from an originator. This ac-
quisition gives the issuer the right to exclude creditors of the originator from the as-
sets, enabling the issuer to use the assets as collateral for securities.
We can describe the securities as a modular set of legal relations: packages of
rights of exclusion, enforceable against the originator's creditors, from payments (and
from property securing payments). These rights are coupled with governance mech-
anisms such as consent to modification provisions. Investors acquire these various
rights and re-convey them in secondary markets, potentially to numerous successors
in interest. If we conceive of these securities as conferring in rem rights, and not just
as tailored entitlements of disaggregated components, then policy makers could
bring property principles to bear on the module: the package of legal relations that
issuers and investors set out to convey has got to "make sense" and be legally recog-
nizable.
This section now turns to an approach to the private law aspects of financial
markets that is quite different from Smith's -an approach that considers the convey-
ance as a technique and an aesthetic practice. In his introduction to a 2012 symposi-
um, John C.P. Goldberg offers what he terms "inclusive pragmatism" in support of
in Corporate Law: An Essay in the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1674-76 (1989).
82 See Armour & Whincop, supra note 20.83 Smith, supra note 17, at 1722.
8 Id.
85 Id. at 1709.
86 For a description of reverse, sequential tranching and its role in the financial crisis,
see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 101 (2007).
87 See infra Part III.A.
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"The New Private Law."88 Where legal realists advocated "brass tacks pragma-
tism" -"getting past mere appearances to what is 'really' going on in the law," 89
Goldberg champions "inclusive pragmatism"-an "antireductionist" approach char-
acterized by "belief in the intelligibility of a broad range of concepts."90 With this ap-
proach, scholars can do the interpretive work of trying to make sense of concepts that
is essential to legal reasoning.91 Goldberg states that "one of the distinctive features
of the New Private Law is its methodological catholicism."92 That said, perhaps a
conception of property rooted in practice rather than theoretical, foundational justifi-
cation is not as divergent from Smith and the thinking of his "new private law" co-
hort as it might at first appear.
In practice transacting parties differentiate between conveyances of rights in
objects they describe, and contractual obligations they may enforce against one an-
other. Identifying common legal techniques that indicate a presumption of difference
between property and contract can support a pragmatist conception of property in
financial markets. In other words, regardless of whether property consists of legal re-
lations that can be infinitely disaggregated, or of things in which interest-holders
have in rem rights, in practice market participants routinely recognize a distinction
between property and contract rights, rights of exclusion in things, and the efficacy
of conveyancing techniques to create in rem rights.
Normativity is law's incorporation of and relevance to social norms. Pragma-
tism is concerned with norms in use day to day. Richard Warner writes that "the dis-
tinctive pragmatic claim about justification" is that there is "no external standard of
evaluation" of norms.93 "Norms of justification neither have nor need a ground out-
side themselves" from a pragmatist point of view.94 An essential point, though, is
that the norms at issue "are the norms we actually use day in and day out. These are
the norms that neither have nor need a ground outside themselves."95 In financial
88 See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 1641.
89 Id. at 1645.
90 Id. at 1652.
91 Id. This Article neither accepts nor rejects the assertion that the "new private law" is
new. Goldberg acknowledges the overlap between his presentation of private law theory and
Ernest Weinrib's. Id. at 1646 n.40. Goldberg states, though, that where Weinrib focuses on for-
malism, he is "claiming for private law the mantle of pragmatism." Id. Whether the new pri-
vate law takes us to new territory is irrelevant here. What matters is that the new private law
participants offer theories of a contracts/property distinction that could facilitate private law
strategies for mitigating complexity and moral hazard in financial markets.
92 Id. at 1649 n.54.
93 Richard Warner, Legal Pragmatism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
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markets, norms in use day to day emerge from the myriad, routine legal practices
that effectuate transactions. The acceptance of form contracts and transactional struc-
tures, documented in routine ways, reflects day-to-day expression of norms.96
Annelise Riles presents a common type of property conveyance in financial
markets as a technique and an aesthetic practice.97 Riles writes about market conven-
tions in her ethnography of derivatives traders in Japan.98 In the course of her work
as an anthropologist, she writes that techniques can be a site of governance.99 Riles
does not set out to provide a theory of property. However, the example of technique
on which her recent scholarship focuses is a property conveyance in the financial
markets context: the assignment of swap collateral.100 Riles defines legal technique to
be "a constellation of material and aesthetic features, and forms of expertise that go
with them."101 These features include the ideology of instrumentalism, legal actors
who view themselves as technicians, problem-solving paradigms, and stock forms of
legal argumentation.
Riles considers how market actors employ legal techniques to effectuate con-
veyances; she then identifies forms of technique as a site for governance. Her ap-
proach presumes the relevance of private law strategies for regulatory innovation.
Riles' presentation of the legal infrastructure of financial markets departs from a con-
tracts-oriented approach not by asserting the existence or theoretical coherence of in
rem rights, but by recognizing the nature and function of techniques that market ac-
tors assume effectuate a conveyance involving temporary rights of exclusion.
96 However, the fact that transactional structures reflect norms does not mean that
parties to a transaction necessarily share normative commitments. See ANNELISE RILES,
COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011). In fi-
nancial markets in which parties can be remote from one another culturally and geographical-
ly, the forms mediate difference and their use may reflect-or be in tension with-norms at
play in each of the parties' legal systems, respectively. Id.
97 Warner, supra note 93; see also Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of Commercial Law -
Domestic and International Implications, 67 LA. L. REv. 689 (2007).
98 See RILES, supra note 96; see also Hughes, supra note 29 (reviewing RILES, supra note
96).
99 See RILES, supra note 96 (discussing use of ISDA forms by Japanese swap counter-
parties to transnational transactions).
100 See id.
101 Id. at 65.
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The practice of collateralizing swap transactions,102 in Riles's view, exempli-
fies legal technique:
Collateral is a set of material and procedural knowledge practices, a
set of documentary and institutional tools and outputs that encour-
ages certain forms of collaboration according to carefully scripted
routines. Just as . . . scientific truths emerge as universally accepted
and legitimate by virtue of the way available scientific instruments,
scientific theories, and institutional and social relations work togeth-
er to reinforce one another, in the financial markets legitimacy
emerges from these interlocking technical practices of communica-
tion.103
The components of collateral -documentary tools, scripted exchanges, institutional
structures, etc. -represent legal technique. Just as conventions and available instru-
ments of experimentation shape scientific truth, techniques that produce legal con-
cepts shape law.104 Riles contends that the recurring forms or practices that constitute
collateral have agency of their own.105 To say that legal techniques have agency of
their own is to regard law as an aesthetic practice.106 Aesthetics concerns the study of
form. Legal techniques are aesthetic practices in that they manifest in recurring forms
of argument, of contract, of institutional structure.
The study of form in law may, at first, appear unrelated to legal formalism
1 07
and the task of articulating property elements of financial markets. We might regard
as just a semantic coincidence any similarity between legal formalism and law as a
function of form, an aesthetic practice. But analytical formalism, as a theoretical pro-
102 A swap transaction is typically a contract between two banks, the swap counter-
parties, specifying conditions under which one party will pay the other, placing opposing bets
on the future value of an asset. The parties may assign collateral (i.e., convey property) to se-
cure performance. For a discussion of derivatives and their role in the financial crisis, see Lynn
A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2011).
See generally Times Topics: Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top
/reference/ times topics/ subjects/ derivatives/ index.html.
103 RILES, supra note 96, at 65.
104 Id.; see Hughes, supra note 29 (reviewing RILES, supra note 96).
105 See RILES, supra note 96, at 65, 82.
106 See id. at 82. For a summary of uses of aesthetics in legal scholarship, see Hughes,
supra note 97, at 695-706 (building on recent work on law and aesthetics to assess aesthetic el-
ements of finance and commercial law).
107 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal formalism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 332 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On
the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). Riles's description of legal techniques
and private governance also veers away from legal realism. Realism is a theory of legal justifi-
cation in which facts and real-world implications drive legal outcomes. There is no reference in
Riles's description of derivatives markets to any shared social context in which relations
among participants generate standards. See RILES, supra note 96, at 63-64.
202 Vol 20:2
Financial Product Complexity
ject and an epistemological orientation, is not separate from formalism's aesthetic el-
ements.08
Formalism has an aesthetic component in that recurring forms -of convey-
ance, of argument, of instrument- appeal to and mediate differences among diverse
market participants. This aesthetic component is especially salient in financial mar-
kets where legal techniques drive the effectuation of transactions involving parties
with remote and potentially divergent values and interests.
Contemporary formalist Ernest Weinrib contends that the private law is a
coherent system "to be grasped only from within and not as the juridical manifesta-
tion of a set of extrinsic purposes."109 He likens private law to love -"a phenome-
non," he states, "intelligible only in terms of itself."110 Weinrib argues that a coherent,
intrinsically purposeful private law reflects Kantian commitments to protecting indi-
vidual autonomy and respecting the free will of others. Critics such as Robert L.
Rabin find the role of Kant in Weinrib's conception of private law inconsistent with
Weinrib's contention that private law is internally coherent. Rabin writes: "On the
one hand, formalism as a nonsubstantive aesthetic principle is misplaced and unin-
telligible in a world of conflict resolution. On the other, formalism as an expression of
Kantian autonomy may be distinctly intelligible, but it is necessarily an expression of
the 'substantively desirable."n" Whether one agrees with Rabin or Weinrib is imma-
terial here. The point here is that the questions they raise surrounding private law's
internal coherence and intrinsic value, the relationship of form to substance, are the
province of aesthetics.
Though Weinrib's formalism is very different from Riles', they both connect
legal formalism and the concerns of aesthetics. Riles focuses explicitly on formalism's
aesthetic elements without endowing formalism with normative content like Weinrib
does. She characterizes legal formalism as the "view that private law doctrines and
techniques can stand as a bulwark against the complexity and indeterminacy of the
market."n2 "Formalism," Riles writes, "cannot be reduced to a theoretical position
108 Riles describes the confluence of analytical and performative formalism in her cri-
tique of Wigmore's comparative law scholarship. See Annelise Riles, Encountering Amateurism:
John Henry Wigmore and the Uses of American Formalism, Northwestern University School of
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Papers, Paper 39, (2001), available at
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art39.
109 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995).
110 Id.
111 Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake: The Idea of Private Law, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2272
(1996) (book review).
112 RILES, supra note 96, at 164.
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and an accompanying epistemology. It is also an aesthetic judgment. . . ."113 The con-
temporary New Formalists, she writes, "share with their grandfathers an aesthetic
orientation, that is, a faith in the inchoate possibilities of form."114 She explores the
"question of formalism's appeal, that is, of its aesthetic dimension."1 15
Again, if one considers formalism as only an analytical school of legal justifi-
cation, Riles's take on swap collateral would seem at odds with a formalist concep-
tion of property in financial markets:
[I]n place of . .. ideas that create coherent standards, . . . I suggest
that we understand the ensemble of legal techniques that make up
the private governance of the global derivatives markets as an as-
semblage of glitches .... We have a flurry of activity that creates dis-
tinctions, sets limits, cuts . .. one line of analysis from another, . . .
that does not "add up" to ... a new source of epistemological or ju-
ridical authority.116
She describes an absence of epistemological and juridical authority."7 The mode of
coherence in Riles's description of global private law in derivatives markets is not a
function of shared norms.118 The notion that the system inheres in a set of forms or
established techniques detached from shared norms suggests a formalism in which
aesthetic practices themselves mediate difference.119 If private law doctrines are per-
petually constructed by performance, rather than constituted by abstract normative
113 Id. at 71. Riles develops this thinking in the context of reading John Henry Wig-
more's comparative law scholarship -specifically, its amateurism. Formalism has a performa-
tive component in its relationship to pedagogy. Id. at 67-68. Wigmore, she finds, "appropri'-
ate[es] the formalism of legal teaching to scholarship, and hence . . . brilliantly collaps[es] the
distinction between performative and analytical genres of formalism." Id. at 75. The lesson we
can draw from this, she finds, is that "formalism, as a genre of scholarship and teaching, may
be effectively performed even when the epistemological or theoretical foundations of the per-
formance are entirely at odds with the beliefs routinely associated with a formalistic under-
standing of law." Id. at 76.
114 Annelise Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan's Netting
Law, Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, Research Paper 00-03 (2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract id=162588 at 6.
115 Id.
116 RILES, supra note 96, at 63-64.
117 See Hughes, supra note 104.
118 Id.
119 Riles writes that "if we define formalism not as an epistemological or political po-
sition, but as an aesthetic propensity, a genre of self-presentation . . . it is easy to see that this
technical aesthetic is by no means the exclusive province of legal formalism." Annelise Riles, A
New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 973, 1027
(2005).
204 Vol 20:2
Spring 2015 Financial Product Complexity 205
principles, it does not undermine their utility as ordering devices in an indeterminate
world.120
This neo-formalist reading of swap collateral in derivatives markets directs
attention to the regulatory potential of legal techniques.121 Riles rejects financial regu-
lation discourse in which one must be either a "new architect" or an "intransi-
gent."122 She contends that the capacity for day-to-day market practices to impact
market governance is under-explored.123
Smith and the "new private law" scholars differ significantly from Riles and
the turn to ethnography and legal techniques.124 They both, though, articulate cur-
rent, theoretically rich conceptions of property in financial markets that can inform
assessment of private law strategies for mitigating complexity and moral hazard (and
resulting negative externalities).125
C. Doctrine: Financial Engineering and Property
This section turns to doctrinal features of financial products that reflect
property, distinguishable from contract, elements. Separating the contract from the
property features of financial products facilitates consideration of private law strate-
gies for financial regulation. We should be able to identify property interests-for
which property concepts are relevant -in financial markets as a doctrinal as well as a
theoretical matter. There are ways in which financial products are property-like. Ar-
thur Allen Leff notes that "it should not be a real jaw-dropper to suggest that regula-
tory and remedial strategies might vary depending upon whether one thought one
was regulating process [contract] or product [thing]." 26
Some financial products have property attributes in the sense that they create
rights of exclusion in excess of what contracting parties can create. These include ne-
120 See Hughes, supra note 104, at 213-14.
121 RILES, supra note 96, at 177-78, 223-28.
122 RILES, supra note 96, at 225.
123 Id.
124 This turn is part of the science and technology studies (STS) movement in which
scholars view law as a technology. STS scholarship draws on actor-network theory, which
seeks to transcend conventional dichotomies (structure/agency, human/non-human), and
consider instances of contradiction, contingency, alliance, etc., in the production of legal
knowledge and legal meaning. See BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
THE CONSEIL D'ETAT (2010); ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (1999); see also EVE
DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS 104-05 (2013) (describing the work of
Bruno Latour and its relationship to legal theory).
125 See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
126 Leff, supra note 59, at 148.
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gotiable instruments, contracts assigned as security despite containing anti-
assignment clauses, and asset-backed securities given invest-grade ratings despite
high levels of recourse from issuers to originators.
Legal scholars have discussed the "propertization" that occurs in certain
transactional contexts.127 "Propertization" refers to transformations through which
normative relations shift from having in personam qualities to having in rem quali-
ties.128 In the case of instruments, the holder-in-due-course doctrine permits buyers
of instruments to enforce payment obligations regardless of whether the obligor has
valid defenses to payment enforceable against the original payee.129 Contract law
permits assignment of debt obligations, but the holder-in-due-course rules elevate
the status of certain holders beyond that of mere assignees of contract rights. Good
faith purchasers may exclude obligors from the moneys payable under the instru-
ment even though, as a contractual matter, the obligors have a defense to perfor-
mance.
In the case of asset-backed securities, investors may acquire rights to pay-
ment collateralized by property held by an issuer that retains a high level of recourse
against the originator. These investors enjoy rights of exclusion in their collateral, de-
spite the fact that the transaction pursuant to which they acquired these rights may
not qualify as a true sale between the originator and the issuer. This may be true in
any securitization (i) governed by the laws of a jurisdiction that enacts an asset-
backed securities facilitation statute,130 or (ii) in which the true-sale status of the
transaction between the originator and issuer is unsettled.
In the case of derivatives, derivatives contracts enjoy a status in bankruptcy
that elevates their value by conferring rights of exclusion in assets of a bankrupt
counterparty, enforceable against other claimants.131 We might consider the extent to
127 See, e.g., Janger, supra note 12; Jonathan Yovel, Relational Formalism and the Con-
struction of Financial Instruments, 48 AM. Bus. L.J. 371 (2011).
128 See Yovel, supra note 127, at 381 n.34.
1
29 To be a holder-in-due-course, a party must have purchased a negotiable instru-
ment in good faith without notice of defenses to enforcement, and the party must have taken
possession pursuant to a valid negotiation. See U.C.C. §§3-104, 1-201(2), 3-303, 3-302(2), 3-301
(1977).
130 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A
(2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2003); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2003); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9-109(e) (2004). Note that the effects of these statues on securitized assets in contexts
where an originator enters bankruptcy is uncertain.
131 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 649
(2010); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011).
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which the special priorities that derivatives contracts enjoy in bankruptcy enable
these contracts to function like property rights.
The fact that in many contexts financial products have property attributes
can bring their regulation within the justificatory ambit of property doctrines con-
cerned with liquidity and soundness of markets. From this vantage-point, exploring
the possibility of standardization, or other information-generating strategies, for fi-
nancial products is not a regulatory infringement on market actors' freedom of con-
tract, but rather administration of private law rules that are already a constitutive el-
ement of financial markets.132
II. Complexity and Moral Hazard
Complexity of financial markets -and the relationship between complexity
and systemic risk -drives many, current discussions of financial regulation. This Part
explores the relationship between complexity and moral hazard. As Steven Schwarcz
has observed, we do not fully "understand the problems of complexity, which was at
the root of many of the failures that gave rise to the subprime crisis."133 We may not
understand complexity, and the task of determining whether and how to regulate it
may be daunting. But we can relate the phenomenon of complexity to the issue of
moral hazard, and then consider private law responses to complexity and their po-
tential to mitigate moral hazard.
Complexity itself is difficult to define. For example, Manuel Utset offers a
taxonomy of complexity in financial systems that parses out complexity of financial
institutions, of transactions involving institutions, of financial systems - mapped
against inter-temporal, coordination, and strategic complexity.134 This Article con-
cerns transactional complexity - the extent to which transacting parties create pack-
ages of rights and obligations that take novel or multi-faceted forms that are difficult
to understand, to which we might apply property concepts.
Awrey discusses various drivers of market complexity, the relationship be-
tween complexity and innovation in finance, and the implications of these for regula-
tion. He identifies "at least six" drivers of complexity in financial markets: technolo-
gy, opacity, interconnectedness, fragmentation, regulation, and reflexivity. 35 To
132 Cf Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 14; Pistor, supra note 4.
133 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 600.
134 See Utset, supra note 5 (applying concepts from the field of engineering to explore
complexity and to recommend engineering-based approaches to complexity in financial sys-
tems).
1s Awrey, supra note 5, at 245-46.
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relate complexity of financial products to moral hazard, this Part draws on Awrey's
discussion of opacity, though the other drivers may also aggravate the capacity and
willingness of market actors to socialize risk and loss while privatizing gain.
Claire Hill speculates that transactional complexity itself could be a strategy
for externalizing risk. She directly links complexity and moral hazard, questioning
whether investors "consider synthetic securitization's complexity to be an end in it-
self, intended to confuse the inquiry into the caliber of the loans at issue."236 This Ar-
ticle does not concern the intentions, per se, of market actors making complex issu-
ances. It considers complexity and financial products generally, to describe how
complexity can aggravate moral hazard.
A. Transferring Risk, Externalizing Risk
There is nothing inherently wrong, of course, with risk transfer -a concept at
the root of financial transactions. Risk transfer becomes problematic when it creates
negative externalities -when it results not just in transferring risk to a buyer for a
price, but in costs to the public. The capacity of market actors to take risks that they
will not have to pay for, the costs of which will be externalized, is moral hazard.
The relationship between transfer of risk and externalization of risk can be
complicated. Parties transfer risk when assets are sold along with attendant risks.
The price, in theory, reflects the various risks associated with the assets. Parties ex-
ternalize risk when they do not price risk into transactions. When this happens, par-
ties impose risk on the public.
As Saule Omarova observes: "Complex structured transactions effectively
separate and repackage ownership, payment, and other rights associated with the
referenced assets. This, in turn, reduces the transparency and flexibility in these mar-
kets, leading to greater systemic risk and instability."137 The capacity of market actors
to profit from issuances of complex products, shifting risk to buyers and, ultimately,
the public, is related to the high degree of complexity of many financial products. If it
is impossible to accurately value a product, then there is greater likelihood that risk
associated with the product will be externalized, rather than priced in to transfers of
the product in the market. The financial and housing markets crises generated much
public discourse on externalities associated with sub-prime mortgages and securiti-
136 Claire A. Hill, The Future of Synthetic Securitization: A Comment on Bell and Dawson,
12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. (2002).
137 Omarova, supra note 6.
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zation, for example; this discourse implicates risk transfer and risk externalization (or
socialization of loss).138
Jonathan Lipson offers an explanation of "the credit crisis in three easy piec-
es": complexity, complacency, and conflicts.139 He focuses on transactional complexi-
ty, contending that complexity makes deals too difficult to understand, thus permit-
ting complacency (of investors and regulators) and conflicts (between originators and
investors, for rating agents, among others) to thrive.140 He asserts that complexity
made both complacency and conflicts possible.141
B. Valuation and Complex Financial Products: the Hazards of Mark-to-model
and Mark-to-market
Opacity surrounding the value of financial products -and hence the finan-
cial health of the institutions holding them-can aggravate moral hazard. Awrey de-
scribes two forms of opacity at play in markets: non-availability of information with-
in a segment of the marketplace, and dense thickets of information that defy the
market's capacity for analysis.142 Complex financial products can result in non-
availability of information, where, for example, investors cannot penetrate the layers
of a securitization facility in order to assess the quality of underlying collateral. If
opacity makes investor due diligence impossible, then issuers can obscure risks. (It is
not entirely clear why, in the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, investors
did not apply larger discounts to securities the value of which they could not accu-
rately assess.143)
Investors may use mark-to-market accounting to determine the value of liq-
uid securities.144 Mark-to-market accounting can aggravate moral hazard because it
enables inflated valuations of securities in "bubble" markets, inspiring investor over-
138 See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Fi-
nance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 101 (2007) (discussing effects of securitization
on borrowers and on predatory lending practices); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106
YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (arguing that secured lending and securitization enable externalization of
costs onto certain classes of unsecured creditors).
139 See Lipson, supra note 7.
140 Id. at 49.
141 Id. at 45.
142 Awrey, supra note 5, at 251-55.
143 Since the financial crisis, scholars have attempted to address this question. See, e.g.,
Claire A. Hill, Why Didn't Subprime Investors Demand (Much More of) a Lemons Premium?, 74
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 47 (2011) (finding that "the most satisfactory explanation lies in the
incentives for herding among agents who made investment decisions for others").
144 Lipson, supra note 7, at 45.
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confidence. Conversely, if the market value of the securities is volatile or becomes
difficult to establish, then mark-to-market valuation can result in rapid depreciation
and panic, leading to calls for bail-out.
Financial institutions, in other instances, issue innovative products for which
there is not a market. They need to value these assets for their books, despite the fact
that they are not liquid. In such cases financial institutions often use a mark-to-model
approach to valuation.145 Innovation and increasing complexity make mark-to-model
valuation more common; if there is not an existing market for a new type of financial
product then there are not external indices with which to determine market value. If
a model for a complex issuance contains incorrect assumptions -such as, for exam-
ple, predicted default rates, which may be incorrect if there is not sufficient history
with which to make accurate predictions -then it may be difficult or impossible to
know what the assets are worth.146 The model with which a financial institution is-
sues and then values securities may be very difficult to understand, or may rely on
information that is difficult to obtain, creating information asymmetries that enable
institutions to appear financially healthier than they are.
IlL. Private Law Strategies
This Part assesses existing turns to property law concepts in discourse on fi-
nancial regulation. Since 2008, various legal scholars have referenced the concept of
numerus clausus as a private law tool that could be of use in financial markets. Section
A summarizes and critiques their efforts. In addition, regulatory innovations such as
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rely on an analogy between financial
products and goods or other personalty, subject to public welfare regulation.147 Sec-
tion B presents this shift from a contract to a property perspective on financial prod-
ucts and its regulatory potential. Section C explores normative implications; it
sketches some possibilities for financial products regulation that follow from this Ar-
ticle's analysis.
145 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 595 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010).
146 See Schwarcz, supra note 6.
147 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2008) (analogizing consumer financial products to goods); Omarova, supra note 6.
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A. Numerus Clausus
Legal scholars invoke the concept of numerus clausus, and property concepts
that discourage fragmentation of interests, in calls for regulatory innovation for fi-
nancial markets. For example, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter cite Merrill and
Smith in the course of arguing that mortgage products should be standardized.148
They identify standardization as information-forcing, drawing on principles embed-
ded in property law. They call private-label mortgage-backed securities "idiosyncrat-
ic property forms" 149 and they contend that Dodd-Frank does not address "core in-
formational problems" in securitization.50 While they observe that "the problems
heterogeneity poses for investors have been recognized by property scholars,"151 they
argue for standardization without referencing or exploring implications of looking to
property, rather than contract, theories and doctrines. They reference literature on
numerus clausus in both property and contract, without engaging differences between
property and contract-based approaches.152
Again, the capacity to draw on property concepts for financial regulation
does not depend on the viability of a contracts/ property distinction. However, the
justificatory posture of regulation and the possibilities for regulatory innovation and
competition can expand if we identify property rights, governed by property doc-
trines, as regulatory subjects.
Jill Fisch references numerus clausus rules to argue that interests in mutual
funds should come in standardized forms in order to drive down information
costs.5 3 Fisch argues for a "conform or explain" approach, where financial transac-
tions either conform to a recognized, widely understood form or the parties ex-
plain-meaning make explicit-the differences.154 Also, she treats financial transac-
tions as products. The "conform or explain" schema would apply to "financial
products" -things that must take a standardized form or explain differences. From a
regulatory perspective, Fisch's argument echoes Saule Omarova's, described in sec-
tion B. We can advocate for standardization if we focus on public welfare effects -if
we view financial transactions as products, regulated for safety.
148 Levitin & Wachter, supra note 12, at 1255.
149Id. at 1255.
1soId. at 1258.
151 Id. at 1255 (citing Merrill and Smith).
152 Id. at 1255 (citing Joshua Fairfield's work on information costs and standardization
of contracts).
153 Fisch, supra note 12.
154 Id.
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David A. Dana argues that state property law "reflects an antifragmentation
principle" evidenced by various sets of rules and concepts.ss He argues that law-
makers should apply this principle to prevent levels of fragmentation of interests in
homes and mortgages that impede rational, beneficial loan modifications.56 Dana
points out that the common law estates system aims to enhance the efficient aliena-
bility of land "precisely by limiting fragmentation of interests in land."157 The law fa-
vors the fee simple estate over the various defeasible fees-interests which may be
cut short by a defeasing event.
Next, Dana discusses statutory unitization of underground oil and gas
fields.158 Oil and gas field unitization statutes address inefficiencies associated with
competition among multiple stakeholders. These statutes reduce the wasting of a
valuable resource that can occur as a result of competition among surface landhold-
ers. Dana writes that these statutes-and courts' approvals of them-show that:
[Clourts. . . have accepted that where existing property rights and
rules and private ordering result in too many parties with an interest
in the same resource, the law has a legitimate role in coercing the
multiple interest holders to act in a more unified, and hence (from an
overall return on private investment perspective) rational, manner.159
Dana identifies these statutes as a precedent for the notion that property law should
unify interests when fragmentation creates inefficiencies. Dana implies that ineffi-
ciencies of the housing and foreclosure crisis are of the same magnitude as inefficien-
cies associated with waste of a natural resource like oil. His article begins with the
metaphor that "one out of every ten houses in the United States is likely to burn
down," meaning that its owner will lose it in foreclosure. Litigation over waste and
actions for unification in the oil and gas context involves many instances of explod-
ing and burning oil and gas reserves.60
Dana does not argue for direct application of estates system rules or of uniti-
zation rules to mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. Rather, he argues that these
rules evidence an antifragmentation principle in property law. He contends that
lawmakers should bring this general principle to bear on the housing market, to pre-
vent inefficiencies like irrational foreclosures and their associated losses.161
155 Dana, supra note 1112, at 97.
156 See id.
157 Dana, supra note 12, at 110.
158 Id. at 111-14.
'59 Id. at 112.
16o See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
161 Specifically, he proposes a federal regulatory requirement to assign servicing of
home mortgages to blind trustees who could facilitate rational loan modifications. Dana, supra
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A general commitment against excessive fragmentation of property, in Da-
na's view, justifies a proposal to consolidate the power to alienate interests in mort-
gages in order to avoid stalemates among interest holders. But, again, the fact that
property law contemplates the effects of complexity on marketability has always co-
existed with the fact that property interests may be held by numerous (potentially
adverse) parties. Dana's contention that property law should inform financial regula-
tion seems more conceptual than literal.
Edward J. Janger draws on property theory and numerus clausus in a recent
piece on liquidity enhancement. Janger argues that financial market participants and
policymakers have not understood costs addressed by numerus clausus rules, as
property theorists do. 162 He presents traditional liquidity enhancing tools-
negotiability and the "holder in due course" doctrine, and purchaser protections
such as the "buyer in the ordinary course of business" -and discusses how these
tools are narrowly tailored to facilitate particular transactions. These tools, he argues,
are limited precisely because "liquidity enhancement has costs, both to the transact-
ing parties, and seemingly paradoxically, to the market itself."16e
In contrast to these traditional, well-tailored devices, recently developed
techniques for increasing liquidity, Janger argues, ignore costs of liquidity enhance-
ment. He identifies (i) securitization and its use of bankruptcy-remote entities, and
(ii) tradability of claims against debtors in bankruptcy and credit default swaps as
contemporary liquidity enhancement ools. He then discusses costs associated with
each. He concludes that the tradeoffs of liquidity enhancement have gone unrecog-
nized and have "led to many of the difficulties in the current economic downtum."1 6 4
Janger relates third-party costs of liquidity enhancement devices in contem-
porary financial markets to a lack of regard for the concepts embodied by the numer-
us clausus principle:
Creating new and complex forms of property has costs. Civil law
countries recognize this through the 'numerus clausus' -an affirma-
tive limit on the number of forms that property interests may take.
Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have argued forcefully that crea-
tion of novel forms of property can have considerable third party
costs because of the inability of third parties to understand the at-
tributes of an ownership interest. . . . [Even critics of Merrill and
Smith] would balk at securitization, credit derivatives and free-for-
note 12, at 107-09.
162 See Janger, supra note 12, at 52-53.
163 Id. at 40.
164 Id. at 52.
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all claims trading. These ownership transactions all serve to obscure
the nature and location of ownership. . . .165
Here Janger is calling for regulation of liquidity enhancing devices that create third-
party costs by obscuring ownership. He invokes the model of numerus clausus to as-
sert that property theorists understand the importance of reducing such costs by lim-
iting, and thereby clarifying, forms of ownership.
Janger does not develop in detail, in his relatively brief piece, how and on
what terms to apply numerus clausus concepts to these liquidity enhancement ools.
He does point out, however, that these tools reflect a legal status that departs from
the realm of contract law. Like holders in due course of negotiable instruments, hold-
ers of asset-backed securities and of credit default swaps enjoy a degree of rights that
exceeds what they would have if these forms of investment property were comprised
merely of assigned contract rights. Janger finds that property law is relevant to regu-
lation of financial markets. It is not fully evident, however, whether he considers
property a source of guiding principles or whether he would literally apply property
doctrine to regulate financial products.
A recent Note applies the property concepts of anti-commons (as developed
by Michael Heller) and numerus clausus (as developed by Merrill and Smith) to assess
the financial crisis,166 suggesting that these concepts could yield solutions to chal-
lenges in financial regulation. The Note, The Perils of Fragmentation and Reckless Inno-
vation, argues that concerns animating property theories contributed to the financial
crisis.16 7 It describes excessive fragmentation of interests in property effectuated by
mortgage-backed, collateralized debt obligations. First, the Note argues that this ex-
cessive fragmentation creates an "anti-commons"-a situation in which property is
used inefficiently as a result of conflicting interests among multiple persons with
rights of exclusion.168 Second, it argues that the property literature on numerus clausus
"casts doubt upon the desirability of introducing partially or fully customizable in-
terests into the marketplace."169
The notion that multiple interest holders in property - with rights of exclu-
sion-can lead to inefficient use could perhaps be a justification for consolidation of
rights. (Dana makes this point using the example of the oil and gas field unitization
statutes.) The notion that there is some efficient degree of disaggregation that the
CDO market failed to produce is, again, an expression of a general, property law
165 Id. at 52-53.
166 Note, Perils, supra note 12.
167 Id. at 1800.
168 Id. at 1808-14.
169 Id. at 1815.
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theme that we can articulate to criticize this market, perhaps to justify some degree of
standardization of financial products.
But the notion that numerus clausus rules could justify standardization in
CDO markets is too generalized to amount to a strong normative argument. The fact
that the terms of the debt instruments themselves can be highly complex makes them
analogous to any other property that is complex to describe and value. An interest in
real estate, for example, may be complex in the sense that it is encumbered by multi-
ple easements, subject to restrictive covenants, or affected by multiple interest hold-
ers. The fact that what investors hold in fee simple is complex to describe and value
is not the concern of numerus clausus rules. These rules address idiosyncratic convey-
ancing -attempts to convey interests that are not recognized by the law. They do not
concern recognizable interests of complex description.
In yet another, recent invocation of property doctrine for financial markets
regulation, C.Y. Chu presents complex financial products as property, and then ar-
gues for application of numerus clausus rules to this type of property.170 This assertion
is the most literal of those discussed here. Chu presents collateralized debt obliga-
tions as property and then argues for application of numerus clausus principles to this
property.171 Chu contends that the packaging and issuance of asset-backed CDOs in-
volves the creation of new information by financial institutions. Complex CDOs are
constituted by this new information, and as such they are property and not mere as-
signments of interests represented by contracts like the debt instruments issued in
traditional pass-through securitizations.172
If we view CDOs as property, Chu argues, we can regulate them like proper-
ty. Chu draws on Merrill and Smith to discuss externalities of CDOs. He compares
externalities associated with CDOs to the externalities of idiosyncratic property
rights, as Merrill and Smith describe them. Merrill and Smith write that by allowing
even one person to create an idiosyncratic property right, the information processing
costs of all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type of property
go up.
Just as numerus clausus rules function to limit the externalities associated with
idiosyncratic property rights, these rules could limit externalities of CDOs:
The externalities mentioned in Merrill and Smith allowed them to
conclude that the form of properties may need to be restricted. . . .
The situation is similar here. Although we suggest the existence of
170 See Chu, supra note 12.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 461, 464-68.
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system externality associated with the individual invention of CDOs,
we cannot conclude the degree of restriction the law should impose
on the creation of CDOs or financial derivatives in general. The key,
in our opinion, is the implicit connection derived from the fact that a
new financial product has been created.173
This argument strikes the same chord as the others' in its effort to connect complex
financial products to property rules limiting forms of interest. But it, too, does not
tease out the difference between products that are complex and products that are
held by multiple stakeholders. The fact that a CDO is a new, complex type of proper-
ty does not mean that interests in this property are complex in the way that concerns
numerus clausus rules.
Yet, there is, as Chu states, an "implicit connection" here. Perhaps the fact
that property law recognizes a connection between complexity of interest and mar-
ketability provides justification on its own for limiting complexity in financial mar-
kets. Chu draws specifically on the externalities-based argument developed by Mer-
rill and Smith (in explanation of the principle of numerus clausus). Yet he, too,
ultimately resorts to a high level of abstraction in describing the connection between
property and financial regulation. "Treating CDOs as property with its intrinsic
problems," he writes, "justifies more intensive regulation. Treating the CDO as a
mortgage property rather than a contract strengthens the rationale of regulation in
both common and civil law traditions." 74
But once we reach this level of generality -in terms of the relevance of prop-
erty doctrines to financial regulation -we have not moved beyond the basic ques-
tions of whether regulation can and should address complexity per se. Without situ-
ating these assertions vis-A-vis the theoretical contention that financial markets are
legally constituted and that property law infrastructure of markets already operates
in many contexts to balance liquidity and complexity, we are no closer to answering
the question of how to effectively regulate financial market complexity. In order to
develop new potential, private law strategies for addressing complexity and moral
hazard, scholars need to undertake more thorough work. The description of proper-
ty/contracts distinctions, and of conceptions of property in financial markets, pre-
sented here are first steps towards exploring the private law infrastructure of mar-
kets so that we can consider strategies such as applying numerus clausus concepts to
financial products.
173 Id. at 469.
174 Id. at 470.
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B. Shifting from a Contract-based to a Property-based Conception f Financial
Products
At the outset of their article, Making Credit Safer, proposing ex ante regulation
of consumer financial products, Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren state: "Because
financial products are analyzed through a contracts paradigm rather than a products
paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe financial products."75 They do not
merely point out that a products-oriented approach supports their analogy to con-
sumer goods for purposes of regulating financial products. Rather, they state that the
contracts paradigm itself is the problem. Because the law has viewed financial prod-
ucts as contracts between creditors and consumers (in which parties may agree to
whatever terms they see fit), consumers have been left with unsafe products. From a
property perspective, if we view transactions as products per se, like goods or other
property, then we can regulate them for safety. Just like the state prohibits sales of
unsafe car seats or toasters (at any price), the state can prohibit sales of certain finan-
cial products.
The financial products at issue in Making Credit Safer are consumer transac-
tions that lead to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or other financial distress due to debtors'
inability to meet obligations or lack of understanding of contract terms (or both). But
the conceptual shift - from a contracts to a property paradigm - has implications be-
yond the consumer context. Saule Omarova builds on this shift in her article, License
to Deal, exploring the possibility of ex ante regulation of complex financial prod-
ucts.176 Omarova presents existing product-approval regimes for pharmaceutical
drugs, chemicals, and commodity futures, and then considers possibilities for and
challenges to regulatory approval of complex financial products.177
These are not the first articles to discuss contracts as analogous to goods.
However, prior works tend to focus on contracts for sales of goods as features of the
goods. This is distinct from presenting financial contracts themselves as personalty
(for regulatory purposes, apart from their classification as such for assignment pur-
poses).*178
175 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 147, at 1.
176 Omarova, supra note 6.
177 See id.
178 See Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (present-
ing standardized contract language as features of the products that are their subjects); Leff, su-
pra note 59 (arguing that contracts are not just the result of an agreement process, but rather
are part of the products to which they pertain).
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Shifting from a contracts conception to a property conception (or vice versa)
of any given transaction may seem semantic. But in fact this kind of shift has under-
scored significant legal reform in the past. In the area of housing, the late twentieth-
century saw a conceptual shift from viewing residential leaseholds as conveyances of
property to viewing them also as contracts between tenants and landlords.179 This
shift informs much of how we understand rental markets today, especially in urban
contexts. In the leasing context, reform of landlord-tenant relations developed by
analogy to U.C.C. Article 2 warranties. The implied warranty of habitability recog-
nized by courts references the sales law concept of implied warranty for protection of
buyers.180 In the financial products context, perhaps lawmakers could articulate a
concept of fitness that could provide a basis for asserting that financial products
should be fit for their ordinary purpose, or fit for specific purposes for which they
were acquired.18 While implied warranties are contract terms, they apply to the
quality of property conveyed between contracting parties.
Bar-Gill and Warren, and Omarova, present financial products as products
per se that the law might subject to regulation on the same grounds that it subjects
consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, or chemicals to regulation. But what supports the
analogy of financial products to goods? These scholars suggest that the analogy
stands on the impact that financial products can have. A toaster can explode and in-
jure someone. A mortgage product can "explode," injuring the debtor, when pay-
ments unexpectedly increase and onerous terms emerge. An industrial chemical can
threaten public safety and the integrity of crucial resources. A complex financial
product can threaten the health of markets on which the public relies for financial se-
curity.
This effects-oriented perspective has been powerful as a rhetorical strategy in
making the case for regulation.182 But there are also other grounds on which to make
the analogy between financial contracts and products or goods. Financial transac-
tions create asset-backed securities, instruments, and derivatives -contracts that we
may describe as financial products. As discussed in Part I above, these kinds of
transactions can confer rights of exclusion to investors that exceed what transacting
179 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Slavin v.
Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 548 N.E.2d 1226 (Mass. 1990); cf Kendall v. Ernest Pestana Inc.,
709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (implied terms in the commercial leasing context).
180 The implied warranty of habitability functions differently from U.C.C. warranties
in that parties cannot disclaim it by contract. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d 1071.
181 Cf. U.C.C. §§2-314, 2-315.
182 Again, this strategy was central to the creation of the CFPB. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text.
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parties may create using only contract law. In this sense, they are property-like and,
therefore, perhaps best viewed as products per se.
C. Normative Implications
Despite the range of scholars and policymakers articulating property con-
cepts in the context of financial regulation, the normative implications of applying
property law rules to regulate financial products are under-explored. This Article be-
gins the kind of inquiry into the private law infrastructure of financial products that
should precede normative declarations. Specific reform proposals that could follow
from this approach might include (i) the use of servitudes in the context of financial
products, 18 3 (ii) application of the concept of unreasonable restraints on alienation to
challenge the enforceability of products that are excessively complex,a4 (iii) a stand-
ardized menu of permissible financial products to which issuers must either conform
or explain deviations,185 and (iv) legislative or common-law standards for fitness or
183 Servitudes could potentially make features of financial products such as consent o
modification provisions, covenants about collateralization, and the like, non-severable from
payment rights and enforceable against successors in interest. Property law historically de-
clined to recognize servitudes on personalty. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Seroitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1956). Now, however, developments in
intellectual property law are igniting interest in servitudes on personal property. These devel-
opments break ground for the possibility of recognizing covenants on financial products.
Granted, financial products are not goods-they are intangibles. The literature on personal
property servitudes focuses on chattels. Historic uses of servitudes on personalty involved
price restraints on goods (that courts refused to enforce, citing anti-trust concerns and the in-
validity of servitudes on chattels). See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Seroitudes, 96
GEO. L. REV. 885 (2008) (on the evolving jurisprudence of servitudes, specifically in the context
of intellectual property licensing); see also Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering Copyright, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1179 (2012); Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449 (2004). Contemporary uses of servitudes on personalty involve high-tech products
and the terms of licenses and other restrictions incidental to products' use. Applying the con-
cept of servitudes in the context of financial products would require further inquiry into the
feasibility of extending these recent developments in servitudes law to intangibles. Van
Houweling identifies three categories of concern with enforcing servitudes: concerns about no-
tice and information costs, about the problem of the future, and about harmful externalities.
She addresses each type of concern in assessing servitudes on personalty. See Van Houweling,
supra, at 890. If we were to expand upon the idea of a covenant requiring consent to assign-
ment of mortgages, we might assess the covenant in terms of these three categories of concern.
184 Restraints on alienation are covenants or conditions that restrict a property own-
er's capacity to dispose of property or that threaten the liquidity of property. See SINGER, Supra
note 13, at 560-63.
185 Cf Awrey, supra note 5, at 292-94; Fisch, supra note 11; Omarova, supra note 6.
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merchantability of financial products.18 6 Each of these ideas would require separate
and thorough explication to determine its viability.
Working from the notion that financial products could benefit from the
property concept of numerus clausus, we could reconsider, for example, the 'true sale'
doctrine. Cast in property terms, this doctrine states that an ownership interest must
take a certain form -a seller cannot convey ownership of assets by a purported con-
veyance that contains terms creating excessive recourse. The ABS statutes8 7, then, we
can view as legislative recognition of a heretofore unknown form of property inter-
est. Bankruptcy courts might refuse to recognize a form of interest that runs afoul of
well-worn characterization doctrines establishing the scope of ownership of various
assets for purposes of delineating a bankruptcy estate (vis-A-vis assets transferred to
off balance sheet vehicles).
Working from the notion that financial products are like other products that
should be subject to public welfare regulation, we can imagine judicial actors or state
legislatures finding implied warranties of fitness to ensure financial product "safety."
Or, such lawmakers might find that terms that are so obtuse as to undermine reliable
valuation constitute unreasonable restraints on alienation and are therefore unen-
forceable.
Conclusion
Moral hazard features prominently in discussions of originate-to-distribute
approaches to lending, and of financial institutions that act with expectations that a
government "bail-out" will ultimately prevent failure. Risk-taking by market actors
originates in transactional contexts governed by contract and property doctrines. Le-
gal scholars have begun to assert that, rather than leave financial markets to the
realm of contract (in which parties may enter into any transactional arrangements
they wish), regulators should consider the logic of property-law concepts like numer-
us clausus that require transactions to conform to a set of legally recognizable forms.
In addition, recent regulatory innovations turn on a shift in perspective from treating
financial products as contracts between financial institutions and their customers to
186 This would involve state common law or legislative reform to adapt concepts of
fitness from the U.C.C. Article 2 and other contexts to the financial products context, perhaps
drawing on CFPB rules as guidelines for defining fitness. Cf. U.C.C. §§2-314, 315; Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Slavin v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 548
N.E.2d 1226 (Mass. 1990). This type of reform could fortify the CFPB's objectives in the face of
political exigencies that could potentially undermine its effectiveness if political power shifts.
187 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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treating them as products per se. If banks were to create financial products that are
more readily intelligible to market participants generally, they would be less able to
generate transactional complexities that can exacerbate the socialization of risk.
What is the role of private law in identifying and addressing market com-
plexity? The turn to property-law concepts in discourse on financial markets regula-
tion is, as yet, under-developed. There may be considerable wisdom in the old, pri-
vate law doctrines that balance tailoring and innovation among transacting parties
with concerns for liquidity. Building effectively on this wisdom to curtail moral haz-
ard, however, will require more, and more detailed, work than scholars have done so
far. This Article provides a starting point.
